This empirical study measures the influence of 99 retired Supreme Court justices, analyzing over 1.2 million citations to over 24,000 opinions of the Court written between 1793 and 1991. It models the appointment process as the selection of a capital investment, treating a justice's output as the precedents generated each term and using citations as a proxy for an opinion's value. This model is applied to the retired justices and their opinions, and its consistency is tested by independently analyzing citations by subsequent Supreme Court and circuit court opinions. Influence values also demonstrably track the results of a well-known survey of judicial greatness. The study challenges several common assumptions. Older appointees have been no less influential than young appointees, and, on an annual basis, older appointees have actually been more influential. Private attorneys have made the most influential appointees, and former judges show no special advantages.
nificant influence over the subsequent development of legal doctrines. Like a capital investment, which a manager expects to generate positive future cash flows, a Supreme Court appointee provides a ''return'' on investment in the form of periodic generation of influential precedents.
Section I of this study sets forth an economic model for the evaluation of Supreme Court justices. Using citations in subsequent Supreme Court opinions as a proxy for influence over legal developments, the model defines a justice's Historical Value, the overall level of contribution, and Appointment Value, the return on investment from the perspective of the appointing president. Section II applies the model to the justices and their more than 24,000 opinions of the Court, tests its consistency using circuit court citation data, and compares the results to a well-known survey of judicial greatness. Section III examines the selection process, including the relative influence of each president, the age and prior experience of nominees, and the effects of Senate advice and consent.
I. An Investment Model of Supreme Court Nominations

A. The President as an Investor
The President . . . shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court. 1 One of the most enduring marks left by a president is undoubtedly his effect on the law through his nominations to the Supreme Court.
2 Despite the limits imposed by the Senate confirmation process, the selection of Supreme Court justices remains an essential part of the presidential prerogative.
3 Indeed, our constitutional scheme represents a compromise between 1 U.S. Const, art. II, § 2 cl. 2. 2 Shortly after President Reagan's election, President Nixon advised him that ''[your] most lasting legacy will be your impact on the Supreme Court.'' William French Smith, Law and Justice in the Reagan Administration: The Memoirs of an Attorney General 58 (1991) . 3 The Constitution plainly indicates that the ''Advice and Consent of the Senate'' applies to the appointment, but not the nomination, of judges. Guido Calabresi noted that recent presidents ''have continued to name people whom they thought would share their views, and that is their right in the first instance.'' Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee on the Nomination of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court (September 17, 1991 those who feared the centralization of executive power 4 and those who realized that a deliberative political body cannot effectively select judges. 5 The Framers rightly assessed the importance of Supreme Court appointments-if anything, they underestimated the degree to which national political battles would be played out before the Court. With an average of 2.7 Supreme Court appointments per president, most chief executives have been able to indirectly extend their influence over the development of law and public policy far beyond the expiration of their own term of office.
Presidents throughout history have attempted to maximize this legacy of influence through the strategic selection of Supreme Court nominees. Like a careful financial manager, a president seeks a candidate who will produce the maximum ''return.'' This return is generally defined in political terms: votes on particular issues, support for a certain jurisprudential philosophy, or satisfaction of some constituency. 6 Political favors aside, an appointee's return will be determined in large part by his influence over the development of the law.
As with any investment, a Supreme Court nominee comes with certain risks. Some of these risks are realized immediately and depend primarily on the individual nominee and the political circumstances. For example, a candidate found wanting in experience, or politically unacceptable, may not survive Senate confirmation.
Even if confirmed by the Senate, an inexperienced candidate remains a 4 ''Mr. Rutledge [the future justice] was by no means disposed to grant so great a power to any single person. The people will think we are leaning too much toward Monarchy.'' 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 119 (Max Farrand ed., Yale rev. ed. 1937) (June 5, 1787). 5 Madison, trusting neither the executive nor the legislature alone, offered several proposals, including executive nomination that ''should become an appointment if not disagreed to within days by 2/3 of the 2d. branch.'' Id. at 2:44 (July 26, 1787). Gouverneur Morris best summarized the final compromise: ''[A]s the President was to nominate, there would be responsibility, and as the Senate was to concur, there would be security.'' Id. at 2:539 (September 7, 1787). 6 Henry Abraham borrows the term ''real politics'' from President Theodore Roosevelt in documenting the historical concern of nominating presidents: ''Whatever the merits of the other criteria attending Presidential motivations in appointments may be, what must be of overriding concern to any nominator is his perception of the candidate's real politics. The chief executive's crucial predictive judgment concerns itself with the nominee's likely future voting pattern on the bench, based on his or her past stance and commitment on matters of public policy insofar as they are reliably discernible. All Presidents have tried, thus, to pack the bench to a greater or lesser extent.'' Henry J. Abraham significant risk because of the president's lack of information. The quality of a ''stealth'' nominee's legal work may not as predictable as that of one with a more significant track record. Young appointees (to the delight of those originally opposing the nomination) have sometimes ''grown in office,'' exerting influence in other than the anticipated direction. 7 Since the young appointee will likely have a long career, 8 any miscalculation comes at great cost. Attempting to offset this risk may explain the recent rise in the selection of candidates with prior judicial experience. 9 An older candidate, however, has a different profile of risks. While recent years have shown that there is some risk in selecting an individual with a track record of controversial legal scholarship, 10 such writings only affect the likelihood of rejection by the Senate. More significant is the risk that an older appointee will have a shorter tenure on the Court, thereby-at least, as has been commonly thought-reducing his expected influence relative to a younger appointee.
Using this analogy, I develop in the next section an economic model of the nominee as an investment, which will then allow assessment of past justices and a critical evaluation of some of these common assumptions.
B. The Investment Model of Judicial Appointments
Consider briefly the net present value (NPV) of a typical capital investment, an asset that generates periodic cash flows:
where r is the discount rate (assumed constant), C 0 the initial cash outlay, and C t the cash flow in time period t. When selecting between mutually exclusive investment options, the preferred choice has the highest net present value. Similarly, when evaluating a potential nominee, a president seeks a candidate with a high expected influence over the law. A justice periodically generates output in the form of precedents. This output can be analogized to the annual cash flow generated by a capital asset. Calculating the ''net present value'' of an appointee requires quantifying the legal influence of 7 See note 34 infra and accompanying text. 8 See Section IIIB1 infra. 9 See note 52 and Section IIIB2 infra. 10 precedents generated in each year of his career and applying the net present value formulation with an appropriate discount rate.
A president may be thought to take one of two possible approaches. When seeking to use a nomination to effectuate some policy or influence the direction of particular legal developments, a president focuses on the political returns flowing from his nominee and may deem influence occurring far in the future less valuable than any immediate effect generated by his candidate, both because of its remoteness in time and the difficulty in predicting how the issues before the Court or the nominee's views on them may change. In this situation, a candidate should be evaluated by applying a positive discount rate to his stream of future legal influence.
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This discounted influence shall be called a justice's Appointment Value (AV) and is defined as NPV using an appropriate positive discount rate r. Other presidents may focus on leaving a historical legacy through an appointment, such that all legal influence exerted by the candidate should count equally, regardless of when it occurs relative to the time of appointment. This measure of influence shall be called a justice's Historical Value (HV) and is defined as NPV using a discount rate r equal to zero.
Computing these values will require a method for measuring each opinion's influence over future legal developments, an ''inflation'' adjustment to allow comparing measurements from different eras, and, for Appointment Value, an appropriate estimate of a discount rate. 
Measuring Influence over Legal Development
With certain adaptations, a scheme developed by William Landes and Richard Posner lends itself well to the quantification of judicial influence, using citations to a judge's opinions as a proxy for his influence over future legal developments. The modern field of legal citation analysis developed out of their 1976 paper describing an economic model treating a body of legal precedents as depreciable stock of legal capital. 13 They postulated that 11 See notes 33-36 infra and accompanying text. 12 This analysis assumes that the initial investment cost is zero or, at least, that the cost is comparable for all nominees, and hence drops out of any comparisons. This cost-the political capital required to shepherd a nominee through Senate confirmation-is difficult to measure and impossible to describe in terms compatible with future influence over the law. Further, once a nominee has been confirmed, life tenure makes any initial cost in political terms irrelevant to the evaluation of that individual's performance as a member of the Court. Of course, such costs remain an important part of the president's screening and selection process. 13 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J. Law & Econ. 249 (1976) . The initial Landes and Posner study, while most important, was not the first such analysis. In the legal world, Merryman performed citation studies of the California courts from the 1950s through 1970s. See, for example, John Henry Merryman, The Authority of Authority, 6 Stan. L. Rev. 613 (1954) . In the scholarly journals a precedent has a value that can be represented by the number of times it is cited in subsequent opinions. Since most opinions become less relevant over time, as the law and the surrounding culture change and develop, they modeled the decreasing number of citations over time as depreciation of a capital stock. They then applied their formulation to a sample of around 1,000 opinions from the 1960s and 1970s. This initial study provided the foundation for a fairly rigorous treatment of citation statistics, and since then, several other papers and books have been published using citations as a proxy for judicial reputation and for tracking the development and depreciation of precedent as legal capital.
14 Measuring a justice's influence on the law falls neatly within the obvious boundaries of citation analysis. 15 Authored opinions represent the primary work product of members of the Court, and the frequency with which a particular opinion has been cited generally indicates how often it has influenced the resolution of subsequent cases. 16 Thus, during a given year, a jusof economics and other social and physical sciences, several earlier citation studies were performed examining the relevance and influence of published articles in the field. See 15 Using citation counts to measure influence over the development of law differs subtly from past usage in the study of reputation. Reputation is generally defined as ''a pro-attitude by other people toward the person 'whose' reputation is in issue. . . . [T]he point to be emphasized is that reputation is conferred by the people doing the reputing rather than produced by the reputed one-and it is conferred for their purposes, not his.'' Posner, Cardozo, supra note 14, at 59. Reputation studies focus most closely on the citation of nonbinding precedents, such as citations of one circuit court of appeals by another. See Landes, Lessig, & Solimine, supra note 14, at 272-73. Here, considering the influence over law exerted by a Supreme Court justice, one need not distinguish between binding and merely persuasive precedents-every citation represents a more or less equal quantum of influence. 16 Following past practice, this study includes citations that distinguish the earlier case because such citations represent an inability to ignore that precedent. See, for example, Landes, Lessig, & Solimine, supra note 14, at 273. In contrast, citations that do not represent a precedent's influence-for example, those that appear in a dissenting opinion, or in an opinion overruling the precedent-are excluded. See note 37 infra for more details on the citations included in this study.
tice's influence will be taken to be the sum of the citations to all of his opinions written during that year.
Other works have addressed most of the common objections to citation analysis, 17 but it is instructive at this point to consider certain potential problems with this type of study. Two hypothetical effects might distort the relationship between number of citations and degree of influence. First, a precedent may set such a clear legal standard that subsequent cases settle rather than go to trial and appeal, resulting in few citations to the case in later opinions.
18 Such a ''superprecedent'' (which obviously exerts great influence) would be underrepresented in citation counts. Second, another type of precedent might leave the law unclear, inducing much further litigation as the courts try to resolve its ambiguity or test the boundaries of the new doctrine. Such an opinion, with marginal or questionable influence, may be overrepresented when counting citations.
The first effect probably does not represent a serious problem. As explained by Landes and Posner, such ''superprecedents'' are unlikely to have a statistically significant effect: ''If a case is highly specific, it will hardly qualify as a 'superprecedent'; by definition it will control only those infrequent cases that present virtually identical facts to those of the case in which it was announced. If it is highly general, and therefore more likely to be an important precedent, it is unlikely to decide-so clearly as to prevent disputes or litigation from arising-the specific form of the question presented in subsequent cases. '' 19 Further, any such case will inevitably have some degree of ''open texture'' where the enunciated legal rule does not obviously apply. 20 Even were such an impressive settlement-generating opinion to appear, courts would likely recognize its influence and cite it frequently (perhaps using similar reasoning in a different context), rather than ignore it as this argument implies. Also, as will be demonstrated, even a justice's most influential opinion constitutes only a small fraction (on av- 17 See, for example, Landes, Lessig, & Solimine, supra note 14, at 272-76. 18 Such an opinion has been termed a ''superprecedent'' and is described by Landes (1967) . In this holding it remains unchallenged; however, in the fringe of the Gideon rule, there remains room for argument about whether it applies or whether countervailing principles limit the right to counsel. See, for example, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right to counsel even in cases of ''petty'' crimes punished by less than 6 months imprisonment); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (no right to counsel in hearings to revoke probation). Like any other legal rule, a ''superprecedent'' will have this fringe of vagueness and will likely induce further litigation to determine its boundaries. erage, 4.7 percent) of his total influence. 21 Thus, if the number of ''superprecedents'' is small, and not unusually distributed, we can expect any distortion to be of minor significance.
The seemingly ambiguous precedent is unlikely to be overrepresented in citation counts. One expects that an opinion is cited only as long as it helps to resolve cases. 22 When a more suitable precedent comes along, citations to the less useful earlier opinion should dwindle. In contrast, if a more helpful precedent does not arise, it may be that the first precedent represents an adequate resolution of a tough legal problem and that the initial low estimate of its influence, because it seemed vague or unhelpful, was simply wrong. Thus, a truly unhelpful precedent should have a small number of citations, but if an apparently unhelpful precedent has a high number of citations, it may be that it was more useful than one might have guessed initially.
Several other factors should be kept in mind, not because of potential to distort citation counts, but as implicit within the definition of influence. The traditional responsibility of the chief justice to assign the writing of opinions suggests that, to the degree the chief retains control over particularly important cases, his opinions may be more frequently cited than others.
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This is merely another way of saying that the chief justice may tend to be (at least marginally) more influential. The justice in the center chair may be in a position to exert more influence than an associate justice of equal or even greater innate ability, but this serves to remind us that influence may not be perfectly correlated with talent.
This methodology may also tend to magnify the influence of the moderate ''swing vote'' justice. 24 A justice who is in the middle of a highly divided Court will tend to be in the majority more often than the others and will therefore (if opinions are assigned randomly) author a disproportionate share of majority opinions, with a presumably higher chance of accumulating citations in the future. One might respond that it is not clear that opinions are assigned in such manner or that authorship of opinions in close cases guarantees future citations-an ineffective or unclear opinion is likely to be superseded. The central point remains the difference between influ- 21 See Table 5 infra and accompanying text. 22 Except perhaps for citations like ''Whichever view is taken of Aherns v. Clark, the case is of little help here.'' Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487, 489-90 (1971), discussing Aherns v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948) . Of course, the Court here did not call Aherns worthless but simply noted that despite the party's argument, it did not apply. 23 See text accompanying note 41 infra. Opinions authored by the chief might also be thought to carry more authority than those of other justices. 24 I am indebted to David Currie for noting his skepticism in attributing higher ''value'' to the swing voter and for focusing attention on the distinction inherent in this study between influence and intellect. ence and talent: like the chief justice, a swing voter of average ability may actually exert more influence over the law than a truly great dissenter.
Similarly, a justice's influence may ebb and flow over time as the composition of the Court changes. Because citations to dissenting opinions are not counted, the influence of a justice found often in dissent may be understated. When a justice disagrees with the rule laid down by the Court, unless the original opinion is later limited or overruled, the dissent generally exerts little influence over the future development of legal doctrines. This problem is similar to that which comes from limiting measurement of influence to citations in subsequent cases-other avenues of influence, such as discussions among the chambers, are completely ignored. In the end, the influence measured by this study must be understood as somewhat limited in its breadth. 25 Finally, this analysis does not exclude ''self-citations''-the citation by a justice of his own prior opinion.
26 Such ''judicial narcissism'' may distort a study of reputation that uses citations to measure how others regard an opinion's author. 27 In contrast, a self-citation should not lower the assessment of a precedent's influence because there is little reason to believe that justices cite their own opinions when it is not useful to do so.
A ''Price Index'' for Citations
Citation studies to date have only compared opinions of approximately the same vintage. 28 To gain a complete picture of the Supreme Court, this study considers its entire history. Because of increasing case volume, as well as other changes such as longer opinions and increasing reliance on law clerks, 29 citation counts have undergone inflation-in other words, two opinions with equivalent influence may have different nominal citation counts. Figure 1 depicts the fluctuating number of opinions written each 25 It may be that these factors raise more concerns in theory than in fact. For example, considering Table 1 infra, most of the justices known as ''great dissenters'' score quite well based solely on citations to their majority opinions. It does not seem that there were great dissenters who were not also great justices overall. A more complete resolution of this issue awaits a future study based on data that includes citations to concurring and dissenting opinions. 26 See, for example, Landes, Lessig, & Solimine, supra note 14, at 278 n.19 (''Selfcitations are more a reflection of how A values A's work, while non-self-citations reflect how others value A's work.''). 27 See note 15 supra. Figure 2 shows the generally increasing number of citations contained within the average Supreme Court opinion. Figure 3 shows, for all the Supreme Court precedents authored each year, the total number of subsequent citations of those opinions by the Supreme Court and by the circuit courts. Figure 4 shows the average number of subsequent citations by the Supreme Court and circuit courts.
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To properly compare the influence of opinions from different eras, we must create a ''price index'' to adjust for these fluctuating and generally inflationary trends. The price index is based on an important assumption: that the influence of the average Supreme Court opinion has remained constant over time. 31 Then, the average number of citations per opinion during a given year can be used to adjust citation counts to a uniform scale. Formally, the citation price index CPI t for year t is defined as
where N t is the number of opinions in year t, c 0 t, j is the raw citation count for the jth opinion in year t, and κ is a normalization constant chosen such that the smallest index value will equal 1.0. The CPI values are smoothed via a 5-year weighted average to alleviate distortions, not present in a typical large market, where the presence of a single influential opinion causes an inordinate effect on the entire year's average. 32 The inflation-adjusted count c t, j for the jth opinion in year t is simply
30 Figures 3 and 4 show that citations trail off drastically in the 1980s, a truncation resulting from the inability to count future citations to these opinions. (A depreciation analysis shows that the ''half-life'' of a Supreme Court opinion-the time it takes to accumulate onehalf of its total expected citations-is about 14 years. See note 36 infra.) The price index will adjust for this truncation effect, though as the number of citations decreases, the smaller sample size leads to greater uncertainty. 31 This assumption may be open to refinement but should provide a reasonable first-order approximation. To test this assumption, Supreme Court and circuit court citations will be separately adjusted and compared. To the extent that opinions should exhibit a similar degree of influence in the Supreme Court and in the circuit courts, then finding a strong correlation between influence as computed from the two independent sets of price-index-adjusted citation data would support the validity of this assumption. See text accompanying notes 45-46 infra for results supporting this hypothesis. 32 This effect is most pronounced in the early years, when the Court wrote relatively few opinions but occasionally produced a Marbury or a McCulloch. This is illustrated by the dramatic fluctuation in average citations to opinions written between the years 1800 and 1825, as shown in Figure 4 . For example, each opinion written in the year 1900 was cited (in subsequent Supreme Court cases) an average of 7.1 times, compared to 10.9 citations per opinion written in 1960. Based on the above formulation, the CPI for 1900 turns out to be 3.6, compared to a CPI of 2.0 for 1960. A 1900 opinion that nominally received 10 citations would have an inflationadjusted count of 36, as would a 1960 opinion that nominally received 18 citations. Thus, a 1900 opinion that has been cited 10 times is deemed to have influence equivalent to a 1960 opinion that has been cited 18 times.
Discount Rate for Appointment Value
A discount rate normally represents the time value of money-a dollar today can be invested and return more than a dollar tomorrow. 33 Similarly, in political terms, an influential Supreme Court opinion in year n may be worth more to the appointing president than the same opinion in year n ϩ 1. Several factors can explain this ''time value of an opinion.'' There is in some sense an opportunity cost-an opinion issued earlier will have the opportunity to influence more cases. Earlier opinions may be more valuable to the appointing president because of potential political value while he remains in office. Finally, early opinions may be more valuable because they are more likely to be consistent with the president's political desires-the difficulty in predicting how an individual will vote increases with time, as individuals change and the issues before the Court diverge from those most important at the time of appointment. 34 Thus, 33 See Richard A. Brealey & Stewart C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance 13-14, 149 (4th ed. 1991). Discount rates often include a component for risk, but because all the data considered here are historical, any uncertainties have already been realized. 34 In the words of Alexander Bickel, ''You shoot an arrow into a far-distant future when you appoint a Justice and not the man himself can tell you what he will think about some of the problems that he will face.'' Time, May 23, 1969, at 24, quoted in Abraham, supra note 6, at 70.
Indeed, such a description has been used of Madison's appointment of Story (Story ''outMarshalled Marshall in his nationalism''), Teddy Roosevelt's appointment of Holmes (after Holmes's vote against the government in Northern Securities v. United States, 193 U. S. 197 (1904) , TR exclaimed ''I could carve out of a banana a Judge with more backbone than that!''), Wilson's appointment of McReynolds, Truman's appointment of Clark and Burton (in Truman's words, ''Whenever you put a man on the Supreme Court he ceases to be your friend''), Eisenhower's appointment of Warren and Brennan (Eisenhower said that his ''two biggest mistakes . . . are both on the Supreme Court''), Nixon's appointment of Blackmun, and, to some degree, Powell, and, most recently, Bush's appointment of Souter. See id. at 7, 69-70; Henry Abraham, Can Presidents Really Pack the Supreme Court? in An Essential Safeguard: Essays on the United States Supreme Court and Its Justices 45-48 (D. Grier Stephenson, Jr., ed. 1991). While in many respects even these judges supported the views of their appointing president (see Tribe, supra note 3, at 50-76), it is worth noting that this the president may place the highest value on near-term influential precedents.
It is difficult to estimate an appropriate discount rate, but one can be approximated by examining the depreciation of legal capital. Once a precedent exists, its value to the legal community declines over time, as issues before the Court change and new precedents accumulate. 35 Although the depreciation rate is not technically the same as the president's discount rate, it responds to many of the same factors and so provides a reasonable approximation. Data on the distribution of citations by the number of years elapsed between the citation and the opinion cited, for all 204,186 citations found in U.S. Reports, yield a depreciation rate r of 6.5 percent.
36 This value will be used to discount the value of legal precedent to compute each justice's Appointment Value.
Putting It All Together
Returning to the NPV formulation of equation (1), we now take the final step in applying the model to Supreme Court justices. The ''cash flow'' in a given time period will be the output of a justice, the legal influence generated, in that period: the sum of the inflation-adjusted citation counts for all opinions he wrote in a given term. Based on the number of years since his appointment, the annual sums are discounted back to ''present value'' at the time of appointment and combined to determine the justice's Appointment Value. In essence,
where c t, j is the adjusted citation count for the jth opinion authored by the justice in year t and r is the discount rate. Historical Value is computed in a similar fashion, but setting r equal to zero to give a justice's precedents equal weight, whenever generated.
abbreviated list of philosophically diverging justices includes 10 percent of the justices in this study. 35 See Landes & Posner, supra note 13, at 267-70. 36 The 95 percent confidence range for this coefficient is Ϯ0.6 percent. The generalized nonlinear regression used the Levenberg-Marquardt method, and the overall residual standard deviation was 245. This fit assumes a single depreciation rate. A much better fit to the data is possible using two depreciation rates: over about the first 28 years, the rate is 6.6 percent, but then it rather abruptly decreases to 3.3 percent. Because an opinion is discounted based on the number of years since the justice's appointment, not based on when the citation occurs, this change in the discount rate does not enter the analysis-only 13 justices had careers longer than 28 years, with Justice Douglas, at 36 years, the longest. 
II. Evaluating the Past Appointees
This section applies the NPV model to the Supreme Court justices and their opinions. It computes, using subsequent citations by the Supreme Court, the Appointment and Historical Values for every opinion of the Court and for each retired justice. It tests the reliability of these values by comparing them to results of performing the same analysis using citations in subsequent circuit court, rather than Supreme Court, opinions (an ''internal consistency'' check) and to a well-known survey of Supreme Court ''greatness'' (an ''external consistency'' check).
A. Appointment Value, Historical Value, and Annual Contribution to Value for the Justices of the Supreme Court
This subsection presents the results of applying equations (2), (3), and (4), using for each opinion's c The data exclude all citations with Shepard's codes indicating citation in a dissenting opinion or one that overrules, reverses, vacates, or supersedes the cited case. See note 16 supra and accompanying text. This resulted in the exclusion of 53,284 citations overall, with 99.7 percent of these being citations in dissenting opinions. Shepard's unfortunately provides no way to distinguish citations found in concurring opinions from those in majority opinions. 38 Because the currently sitting justices continue to author opinions, and because citations to their existing opinions continue to accumulate, they cannot fairly be compared to those who have already completed their careers, so they are considered separately. Observant readers will also notice the absence of Justice Blair, who is excluded because he never authored an opinion of the Court. In Blair's defense, he did contribute an occasional seriatim opinion. 41 Applying a discount rate has caused some divergence between AV and HV (for example, John Marshall moves up from rank 18 to rank 6 without discounting), though there remains a strong correlation of 0.9 between the two values.
Another useful benchmark can be defined: the annual contribution to value, computed by dividing the Appointment or Historical Value by the number of years each individual served on the Court. These figures provide a different perspective: which justices were most influential, not over the course of an entire career, but in their average year? Tables 3 and 4 Few knew what to expect of Waite when he was appointed by President Grant-he had no judicial experience and had never even argued a case before the Court. But Waite ''took the reins of leadership . . . proved to be a good manager . . . won over his colleagues . . . [and] was remarkably industrious, setting an example by taking on the largest share of opinions to write himself and by assuming the work of his colleagues when they were ill.'' David T. Pride, Morrison R. Waite, in Cushman, ed., supra note 38, at 213. Waite authored an average of 62 opinions every year for 14 years-compare that to the 75 opinions produced by the entire Court during the 1995-96 term. His extremely high level of productivity apparently translated into substantial influence over subsequent cases. 41 See text accompanying note 23 supra for further discussion of the influence of the chief justice. 42 The current justices are disadvantaged in any comparison with their peers who have completed an entire career, especially when considering cumulative values. Further, because the available citation data for this study only include citations in opinions published in U.S. Reports through 1992, there is a ''truncation effect'' on citation counts for more recent opinions, for which the CPI adjustment probably only partially compensates; see note 30 supra and accompanying text. The results for the current members of the Court, excluding Justices Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, who have not been on the Court long enough to accumulate significant citation data, are as follows: As one might expect, the cumulative AV and HV rank in approximately the order in which the justices were appointed: those with longer tenure on the Court have had more opportunity to influence the law. Without further analysis it is difficult to assess the distortion created by the truncation effect. But even without the additional citations and opinions that will continue to accumulate, Chief Justice Rehnquist has an AV, HV, and cHV high enough to rank him Table 5 lists the most influential opinion authored by each justice, the opinion's Historical Value (oHV), and the percentage of the author's Historical Value represented by that opinion (%HV). The most influential per curiam opinion is also listed. Most of these opinions are quite familiar, predominantly constitutional cases, but there are also several involving antitrust, labor, regulated industries, and administrative law. 43 An average weighted by the author's HV demonstrates that each justice's ''most influential opinion'' represents on average only 4.7 percent of that total. This indicates that HV is relatively insensitive to the effect of a single influential opinion, except for justices with extremely low HV, where a single opinion sometimes constitutes a significant portion of that judge's career-long contribution to the law. Table 6 presents the 25 most influential Supreme Court opinions, based on each opinion's Historical Value (oHV). It also indicates the major subject matter addressed by each case.
B. Internal Consistency Check: Comparing Circuit Court Citations to Supreme Court Citations
To test the internal consistency of the model, this section repeats the Appointment Value and Historical Value computations, using circuit court rather than Supreme Court citations. Assuming that an opinion will influence Supreme Court and circuit court cases to a similar degree, the same analysis applied to the two independent sets of data ought to yield highly among the most influential of justices. Also noteworthy, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor have high-ranking cAV and cHV scores.
43 Justice Peckham's Ex parte Young has been more than three times as influential as his Lochner v. New York-a favorite of law professors, but cited much less frequently by the Court (Lochner contributed 128 to Peckham's HV-1.6 percent of his total). 44 The most significant opinions for the current justices listed in note 42 supra are as follows: As one might expect, as tenure increases, the share of total HV claimed by the most influential opinion tends to decline. correlated results only if the methodology is truly measuring influence and the citation data are properly inflation adjusted. 45 Each justice's AV and HV are recomputed by setting the raw number of citations c 0 t, j in equations (2) and (3) to the number of times his jth opinion of year t was cited in circuit court opinions published in the various editions of the Federal Reporter. Comparing these results to the AV and HV presented earlier demonstrates a very strong relationship. A linear regression of the two computations shows that the AV from circuit court citation data is 7.1 times the AV from Supreme Court citation data, with an R 2 of 0.93; similarly, the circuit court HV is 7.0 times the Supreme Court HV, with an R 2 of 0.95. Problems in defining the CPI would likely show up as a poor correlation between these two measurements. For example, because variations in citation rates in the courts have not always corresponded closely, 46 one would expect a low R 2 if there were a problem in adjusting for changing citation patterns. Instead, the strongly correlated results from similar analyses on two independent sets of citation data indicate consistency in the methodology.
C. External Consistency Check: Comparing Historical Value to Other Measurements of Influence
In 1978, Albert P. Blaustein and Roy M. Mersky published a study of 65 law school deans and professors of law, history, and political science, who were commissioned to rank the first 96 justices into categories of ''great,'' ''near great,'' ''average,'' ''below average,'' and ''failure. '' 47 Compared to the current study, Blaustein and Mersky's survey used far more subjective criteria for evaluating justices and defined Greatness more broadly than a justice's influence over the development of law. 48 Thus, many justices who 45 See note 31 supra and accompanying text. 46 See Figures 3 and 4 . 47 48 At least one author has suggested that the most proper way for rating and comparing justices is by assessing their relative influence over legal developments. Criticizing a more recent but less thorough study than Blaustein and Mersky, Schwartz noted that, to him, ''Supreme Court greatness is virtually synonymous with influence on the law. Nevertheless, comparing the results of these two studies demonstrates a strong positive relationship between Historical Value and Greatness. Table  7 shows the results of a multiple regression with dummy variables for each of the Greatness categories, leaving the ''average'' category out of the regression as a baseline. The coefficients show that HV declines with the Greatness category, from ''great'' through ''below average,'' with strong statistical significance. Thus, Historical Value as defined and calculated by this study is indeed related to a justice's perceived reputation.
Interestingly, the ''failures'' are not statistically distinguishable from those rated ''average.'' The survey ranked the relatively unknown justices as ''average,'' with ''failure'' apparently reserved for justices deemed affirmatively bad. We should not therefore be surprised to see justices in the ''failure'' category scoring higher than those considered ''below average.'' For example, chief among the ''failures'' is Justice McReynolds, whose negative reputation derives far more from his blatant misogyny and anti- Although Bradley's study includes a very useful bibliography of surveys of judicial greatness (id. at 24-31), he includes much less information than Blaustein and Mersky, and his results appear questionable in several respects. In the spirit of David Letterman, Bradley requested only that each participant identify the top 10 justices, not that they rate each justice. His samples were drawn from scholars (in political science, but apparently not law), attorneys (but only those listed in the telephone directory), Illinois state and municipal judges (not federal judges), and students (from two undergraduate courses and one graduate seminar in political science). Id. at 11-13. Blaustein and Mersky, in contrast, supported the credibility of their sample population by providing the reader with a list of the 65 recognized scholars who participated in their study. See Blaustein and Mersky, supra note 46, at 117-18.
Bradley's survey results were listed by participant group and as totals, apparently without any weighting. Including the category ''great justices according to students,'' for example, seems dubious: these students rated Justice Blackmun higher than true greats like Black, Brandeis, Cardozo, Frankfurter, Story, or Taney. Bradley, id. at 14-17. If nothing else, this survey proved that students (at least those surveyed) know little about the Court besides the names of some of its recent members. Id. at 17-18. 49 See David P. Currie, The Most Insignificant Justice, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 460 (1983). Justice Duvall also scores poorly here-though I would hesitate to call him the most insignificant. His rank is 93 out of 99 in both Tables 1 and 2 . Even if we take into account Duvall's long and unproductive tenure on the Court (demoting him to rank 97 and 96 in Tables  3 and 4 , respectively), Duvall was nearly twice as influential as Cushing, whom I might consider the most insignificant based on his poor HV after his 20 years on the Court. Especially given the high expectations based on his promising contributions at the Philadelphia convention, I would also consider Justice Wilson a stronger candidate for the most insignificant. Semitism than from incompetence or, more to the point, failure to generate influential precedents. 50 Indeed, were justices like McReynolds less influential, they might not have attracted enough notice to be deemed a ''failure'' by the set of twentieth-century scholars surveyed by Blaustein and Mersky.
III. Court Packing: The Presidents and Their Selection Processes
Throughout history, presidents have to varying degrees sought to pack the Court. Like the Blaustein and Mersky survey, most evaluation of potential nominees has been an intuitive, subjective process. Presidents consider a wide range of factors, which include, among other things, the candidate's ''real politics,'' 51 perceived legal ability, experience, age, and health. Their choices have sometimes been constrained by political circumstances, often in the form of a promised confirmation battle over a candidate unacceptable to a powerful Senate faction.
A candidate's ''real politics'' is thought to affect the direction of his influence-in what way will he shape the law? Intellectual ability, legal experience, and age are perceived to affect the expected magnitude of his influence. Nominees with prior judicial experience are thought to have less of a ''learning curve'' and to hold more sway with their colleagues. 52 Age and 50 See Abraham, supra note 6, at 177-80. Easterbrook, though writing for an altogether different purpose, appears to concur with this understanding of Blaustein and Mersky's classifications. See Easterbrook, supra note 49, at 484. 51 See note 6 supra and accompanying text. 52 Over the last 50 years, exactly half of the Supreme Court appointees were federal judges, and just over 60 percent were judges in either state or federal courts. In the last 20 years, every appointee has been a judge, with only two from state courts. See also Abraham, supra note 6, at 56-59.
health, as proxies for anticipated longevity, relate to the number of terms during which a candidate will vote and generate opinions and thereby influence the course of the law. Many have assumed that younger appointees will have longer tenure on the Court and, therefore, will tend to have a greater effect on the law.
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The political cost of waging a confirmation fight may sometimes lead a president to select a ''safe'' candidate-one with obvious merit, perhaps even a member of the opposing political party-or a ''stealth'' candidateone who has taken few public positions on controversial legal or political issues. The presence of a strong Senate limits the president's freedom in judicial selection, perhaps sometimes leading him to settle on someone he views as a less-than-ideal nominee.
Presidents have relied on these assumptions without substantial information regarding their merit. This section explores these issues, using as benchmarks the retired justices' AV and HV, as developed in Section II.
A. The Presidents
The relative effectiveness of each president's Supreme Court nominations can be compared by combining the scores of their appointees.
54 Table  8 ranks the presidents by the total combined Historical Value of their appointees, showing that many of the great presidents also exerted a significant effect on the law through their Supreme Court appointments.
55 Table  9 54 Presidents Bush and Clinton are excluded from these charts as too recent to fairly compare their influence. Also excluded are the four presidents who made no Court appointments: Carter, Andrew Johnson, William Henry Harrison, and Taylor. Of these, only Carter served a full 4-year term. 55 Among the top finishers here, Presidents Lincoln, FDR, Cleveland, T. Roosevelt, Wilson, and Eisenhower consistently rank high on surveys assessing the importance of presidents. These surveys also consistently rank Nixon, Grant, and Harding as the worst three presidents, though each showed a great deal of success with their Supreme Court appointments. See Abraham, supra note 6, at 415-17 (tabulating results from eight different presidential surveys). pointees of any president, even in combination his were among the least influential of justices. This might be due in part to the low caseload of the Court in its early years; however, the CPI should largely adjust for such variations. More likely, the cases decided by the pre-Marshall Court have simply had relatively little ongoing effect on the law. Table 10 compares the justices' age at appointment and various influence measurements based on the political party of the appointing president. In every category, the appointees of Republican presidents have been significantly more influential than those of Democrats. 57 Especially interesting in light of their stronger influence scores, the 15 Republican presidents generally selected older candidates (on average, 56 years for Republicans vs. 53 years for Democrats). In terms of overall effect on law, the greater number of Republican presidents combines with their greater effectiveness in candidate selection to yield a total HV of around 354,000 for their nominees, nearly double the total of 177,000 for nominees of Democratic presidents.
B. Age, Prior Experience, and Political Factors Affecting Selection
Some of the most significant assumptions made by presidents involve the relationships between a potential nominee's age, experience, and likely influence. This section focuses on these important issues of judicial selection.
The 99 Supreme Court justices from Section II are classified by their age at appointment into five categories: ''45 and under'' (16 justices); ''46-50'' (16 justices); ''51-55'' (27 justices); ''56-60'' (26 justices); and ''over 60'' (14 justices). The multiple regression uses dummy variables for these categories, leaving out the ''45 and under'' category as a baseline. The justices are also organized by predominant area of prior experience when nominated 58 into four categories: ''executive and legislative officers'' 59 (27 justices); ''judges'' 60 (41 justices); ''law professors'' (4 jus- tices); and ''private attorneys'' (27 justices). Similarly, dummy variables are used for these categories, leaving out executive and legislative officers. Several political factors are also included: whether the Senate was controlled by a different party than the president; whether the appointment occurred during the president's first term of office; whether it occurred after a previous unsuccessful nomination; and whether the appointee was from a different political party than the president. 
Age
As most have suspected, a younger appointee is more likely to have a longer tenure on the Court. A linear regression shows that the average career duration d for past appointees is given by where a is the age at appointment, with an R 2 of 0.13 and the t-ratios on the coefficients as indicated. Thus, the average 60-year-old appointee will remain on the Court for 13 years. This result supports the common wisdom that selecting a younger judge will increase the candidate's expected dura- tion-though only by about 6 months per year younger, with the R 2 showing that there remains much unexplained variation in length of tenure.
Many presidents have nominated young candidates in the expectation that they would exert greater influence by virtue of their life tenure. However, the extremely low t-ratios on the age coefficients in Table 11 indicate that age actually has no predictive value for the candidate's net career influence, even though younger candidates, having longer careers, produce opinions over a longer period of time.
This presents a puzzle: if younger appointees have longer careers, why do they not exhibit an overall greater degree of influence? Table 12 suggests an explanation. The age coefficients in the multiple regression for cAV and cHV are all significant, most at the 0.05 level, with all coefficients exhibiting positive effects relative to the ''45 and under'' baseline that generally increase with age. With respect to both cAV and cHV, the appointees older than 60 are as a category the most influential. Older appointees are clear winners in average annual influence.
There are several possible explanations for this unexpected result. First, an older appointee brings more experience-the ''wisdom of years''-to the judicial role, resulting not only in a shorter learning curve, but also in better opinions. 61 In the judicial profession, age may bring added respect, more reputation with colleagues and lower courts, and the assignment of more important opinions. Some have suggested that there is a limit on the number of years for which an individual can remain interested and able to contribute effectively; a younger appointee might have a higher probability of bumping up against such natural limitations. 62 Finally, older candidates have a more substantial track record of past performance, enabling a president to make a more informed judgment about that person's likely future performance on the Court.
As an odd corollary of these results, a 60-year-old appointee appears more influential than a 60-year-old justice who has already been sitting on the Court for 10 years. Imagine that the two 60-year-olds perform at an identical level and that the annual performance of the sitting justice has risen, not declined, during the last 10 years. Assuming an equivalent level of performance into the future, the annual contribution values for the new appointee will be higher than that of the sitting justice because the sitting justice's 10 years of ''learning the ropes'' will always tend to depress his lifetime average. 63 Also, because there is not a one-to-one relationship between expected career duration and age at appointment, 64 the younger candidate, spending his early years gaining needed experience, may not end up serving long enough to make the best use of that experience. Thus, the higher average annual influence of older candidates suggests the importance of acquiring a critical mass of experience before joining the Court. 65 
Prior Experience
Unusually risk averse, Presidents Ford, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton have unanimously appointed individuals with prior judicial experience. Of the current members of the Court, only Chief Justice Rehnquist had not served in the judiciary when nominated by President Nixon. Throughout history, nearly half of those appointed to the Court came after significant judicial careers. Some have suggested that this development represents an unhealthy trend toward professionalization of the Supreme Court, which as a vital political body would be better served by a more diverse collection of individuals. 66 The multiple regression results demonstrate that the average influence of justices coming from private practice is significantly greater than those from other categories. In terms of both net influence and average annual influence, Tables 11 and 12 show that private attorneys have very high and statistically significant coefficients (with all except cAV significant at the 0.05 level). The coefficients on the other categories suggest that law professors on average score close to private attorneys and that judges score lower, though better than the baseline executive and legislative officials. However, with the low t-ratios on these terms, little significance can be attributed to those results.
Former judges as a class appear not to have been the most consistently influential of justices. 67 Especially given the similar backgrounds of most of the current members of the Supreme Court, these results argue in favor of broader consideration of private attorneys (and perhaps law professors) for upcoming appointments.
Political Factors
For the most part, the political factors analyzed seem to have little significant effect on the various measures of influence. Surprisingly, the coefficients on most of the factors listed in Tables 11 and 12 are consistently  positive. When the Senate is controlled by his political opponents, a president may make ''safer'' selections in attempting to fill a vacancy on the Court, and one might think that this constraint on the president's selection could hinder his ability to select the most influential candidate. In terms of cAV and cHV, Table 12 shows a marginally significant positive effect on an appointee's expected annual influence when the Senate is controlled by an op-position party. It might be that the political obstacle of Senate confirmation encourages discipline in the selection process, perhaps forcing it to turn on the nominee's experience and quality rather than political factors. In any event, a ''hostile'' Senate has tended to yield justices who are somewhat more influential than otherwise.
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Over two-thirds of the justices were selected by presidents serving their first term of office. First-term nominees have large positive influence coefficients, though only the cHV t-ratio approaches statistical significance.
One would also expect selection of a safe, ''confirmable'' nominee after a prior candidate was rejected by the Senate. The regressions show that little predictive value can be attributed to this factor. It can at least be said that the rejection of a president's nominee does not consistently lead to subpar subsequent nominations as some might have expected. This study has developed an economic model of Supreme Court appointments, a tool for assessing and comparing the influence of judges from the standpoint of an appointing president. Based on analysis of the careers of past justices, it appears that certain common presidential assumptions may be open to question.
The prospective Court packer would do well to place less emphasis on seeking the youngest confirmable nominee. Given two candidates of different age, a president should not select the younger simply because he expects that candidate to have a longer career and hence greater influence. Instead, this study suggests that age should be a positive factor in the selection of Supreme Court justices, if it is considered at all. A nominating president should also realize that an older candidate is more likely to provide an immediate effect on the course of the law. The selection of older candidates should also reduce the variability in quality of justices, not to mention the likelihood of justices diverging philosophically from the views they held (or were perceived to hold) when nominated.
Although state and federal judges may be ''safe'' Supreme Court nomi- 68 An analysis of the fraction of the Senate voting to confirm showed no relationship between the fraction voting for confirmation and the eventual influence of the appointee. This is not unexpected: most of the disciplinary effect of the advice and consent process occurs before the confirmation is ever brought to a vote. A president facing a potentially hostile Senate knows well in advance to tailor his selection to overcome objections that could derail confirmation. 69 A perfect example lies in President James Madison's simultaneous nomination of two justices after the Senate rejected Alexander Wolcott and John Quincy Adams refused to serve. Madison nominated Joseph Story, one of the truly great justices, and Gabriel Duvall, one of the most insignificant. See note 49 supra.
nations, private attorneys have made for significantly more influential justices. Given the homogeneity of the present Court, this study recommends heightened attention to diversity of background in future nominations and urges the consideration of a private attorney or perhaps a law professor.
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Of course, selection of Supreme Court justices will always entail individual scrutiny, the gauging of character and of the political climate. Any notion that a statistical study can provide a president with ''the answer'' as to which candidate will make the most influential justice is simply ludicrous. The value of a quantitative study such as this is not the replacement of political judgment but its education, so that the nomination process can proceed absent the baggage of uninformed (and potentially misleading) intuitions. This study, questioning and testing certain basic assumptions, provides a first step in that education.
